The Washington Post reported over the weekend that the Pentagon is preparing for ground-based operations in the ongoing war with Iran, a conflict in which, to date, the United States has pursued via air and maritime strikes but not committed any ground troops. Much of the speculation about new offensive operations has focused on additional land forces being deployed into theater, including large elements of the legendary 82nd Airborne Division, highly skilled special operations forces, and two Marine Expeditionary Units. President Donald Trump encouraged his Truth Social following to watch Mark Levin’s interview with Marc Thiessen in which the two political commentators made the case for—and minimized the risks of—ground-based operations against Iran.
None of these are definitive proof of a next phase in the conflict (or, given the president’s statements and reported interest in ending the conflict quickly, that it will even continue). But they are all indicators that the president is considering additional options to compel an Iranian concession, or at least that he wants the regime to think he is considering them. For all of Pete Hegseth’s bluster about the truly incredible feats the U.S. military has achieved against Iran, it is clear that the kinetic strikes have not yet been sufficient to bring about a change in Iranian decision-making. If Trump wishes to increase the pressure against the regime, adding a ground component to the campaign may be a means he is considering.
There are no indications this would be a replay of Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003, wherein a large-scale American invasion destroyed the Iraqi Republican Guard, seized the major cities, and deposed the government. First, the administration has not suggested that something that large is being entertained. Second, there are structural indicators that the Pentagon is not preparing such plans. Iran is much larger than Iraq, both in terms of geography and population, and even the additional forces being deployed in theater are a tiny percentage of those we staged in Kuwait prior to invading Iraq. So, what kind of options might the president be considering?
The possibilities that have been discussed or reported can be binned into three categories: those that increase the pressure on the Iranian regime (e.g., seizing Kharg Island), those that seek to blunt some of Iran’s responsive options (e.g., clearing the coastal zones from which the Iranians can attack the Strait of Hormuz), and those that seek to achieve a limited, but quantifiable effect against one of the stated strategic objectives (e.g., a raid to seize Iran’s remaining 60 percent enriched uranium).
The United States seems to have entered into the conflict with Iran under the operating assumption that a series of truly impressive and destructive air and naval strikes would be so damaging to the regime that Iran would naturally decide that an agreement on American terms would be preferable to the continued destruction and carnage. That has not yet been the case: The remaining regime leadership has not only signaled no willingness to concede but has doubled down on its statements of resistance. While only the administration and the regime know the truth of what is being communicated behind the scenes, if Iran is not willing to agree to American goals, then the current level of military pressure has not yet met the overall intent.
With an already impressive air and sea campaign that has targeted Iranian leadership and military capabilities, but at the cost of large quantities of our precision-guided munitions stocks, there may not be much additional leverage to be created without exerting additional force on land.
Seizing Kharg Island could bring this additional leverage. Kharg represents a major hub for Iran’s oil export capability, with more than 90 percent of the country’s crude oil exports transiting through it—making it a prime target of value to the regime. With Marine amphibious task forces deployed in support of Operation Epic Fury, Kharg is likely high on the list of Trump’s menu of options.
That menu could also include operations meant to deny Iran some of its warfighting options. Currently, the Iranian regime is using means by which its leaders believe they have an asymmetric advantage since they are incapable of fighting the United States on equal footing. One of these, as was predicted through years of planning for just such a conflict, is snarling international commerce and maritime traffic in the Strait of Hormuz. While reopening the strait would obviously require a heavy maritime component (both in terms of mine-clearing operations and potentially armed naval escorts through the strait), Iran’s ability to threaten shipping also emanates from ground-based systems such as cruise missiles and drones. A ground offensive to clear some of the coastal areas to the north of this critical waterway could push back the areas from which Iran can launch some of these capabilities.
While both of these options are plausible, neither is without risk, and, furthermore, there is a question as to whether they would actually achieve an enduring effect.
In the case of Kharg Island, seizing this economic hub from Iran would surely increase the pressure, but the question is how much? We currently have the ability to strike Kharg from the air, and we have, diminishing its utility to Iran while putting fewer American forces in harm’s way. Would the presence of U.S. Marines on the island change the Iranian calculus to a major degree, or only slightly, and is that worth the additional risk of keeping Marines, in need of open supply routes, there under indirect fire and drone threat? And, if this does not change Iran’s decision-making, then what? We would theoretically need to maintain our presence there for the duration, until such a time when additional means do coerce the Iranians or we withdraw having exerted futile effort.
It’s possible the president may look at a Kharg Island option not only in order to increase coercive pressure, but also as a limited-duration operation to “take the oil” there—an effort that would likely require loading oil tankers while under Iranian rocket and drone attacks.
In the case of clearing coastal zones near the Strait of Hormuz, this would likely deny the Iranians some capability to affect the strait, but the amount of terrain that would be needed to clear all Iranian capabilities is not feasible, particularly with the limited number of forces deployed. Even if the Marines clear dozens of square miles inland, Iranian drones maintain the ability to threaten and attack commercial shipping from hundreds of miles away. Further, as with Kharg Island, this would represent a temporary gain, with Marines hypothetically holding this territory until they withdraw, leaving Iranian assets to return to their previous activities. Without Iranian concession or surrender, the effect of such an operation would likely fade hours after we withdraw forces.
The third option would, in theory, achieve a specific and definitive goal, allowing the president to make progress towards one of the war’s strategic aims without Iranian agreement. Specifically, special operations and airborne forces could conduct a specific and limited raid to secure the remaining 60-percent-enriched uranium the Iranians retained after Operation Midnight Hammer. This would be significantly more complex than, for example, the raid to capture Nicolás Maduro, with greater distances; longer duration; more opposition; the amount, weight, and specialized handling of the material involved; and potentially the condition of the facility in which it currently rests. If the uranium hexafluoride is, as is widely suspected, buried under the rubble of the Isfahan nuclear facility struck during last summer’s attack, this operation could take multiple days to excavate, secure, and remove it.
All three of these options will inevitably come with additional risk. Not only will American soldiers and Marines potentially face Iranian forces in close combat, these operations would further test the air defense systems that cover American forces from Iranian ballistic missiles and drones, placing the land-based forces closer to the points of origin of these attacks. But these options will also likely put U.S. forces within range of shorter-range unguided rockets and, in some cases, traditional tube artillery.
Regardless of which, if any, of these options the president may be considering, the introduction of ground forces onto Iranian soil is a significant step, even if necessary. In a war for which Trump never really made the case, about which he has not spoken directly to the American people, for which popular support is already waning, and for which he did not seek congressional approval, it is crucial that he make the case before pulling the trigger on any of these operations that would, undoubtedly, result in more American deaths.
The fact that the president may be considering such an escalatory step in a war that started with lower levels of support than previous efforts and is creating continued American doubt and skepticism, particularly in light of recent ambiguous articulation of the goals (with Secretary of State Marco Rubio, Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth, and press secretary Karoline Leavitt all offering slightly different versions of the four criteria within 24 hours), without first rallying the American people seems to demonstrate a continued issue with the president’s thinking.
Like the old click-bait articles that plagued Facebook promising weight loss with “one simple trick,” President Trump may be viewing these escalatory ground-based options not in terms of high-risk, though necessary, steps in an overall campaign carefully designed to bring about a new desired status quo, but rather as the “one simple trick” that allows him to declare victory and leave. To do so would leave unaddressed residual regional disorder and unanswered the question as to whether these moves will be worth the risk to which we will be exposing our soldiers and Marines.
