In the days since President Donald Trump ordered strikes on three Iranian nuclear sites, media outlets have reported that the strikes did not entirely destroy the facilities at Isfahan, Natanz, and Fordow, and may have set Iran’s nuclear program back by only months, not permanently. The coverage thus far is based largely on anonymous sources citing a classified report—a leak, in other words.
The articles and resulting commentary have reignited debate about the advisability and effectiveness of the bombings themselves, as well as the capabilities of the U.S. intelligence community. While I have no insight into the state of Iran’s nuclear program, I understand how intelligence analysis works. And I know that leaking preliminary assessments, regardless of motivation, weakens American national security.
Battle damage assessment (BDA) represents one of intelligence’s toughest challenges. The best assessments combine satellite imagery, human sources, intercepted communications, and other classified methods. Each provides pieces of a larger puzzle analysts must carefully assemble.
This task becomes exponentially harder when trying to assess underground facilities in hostile territory, as with Iran’s nuclear facilities. Satellite imagery reveals only so much about subterranean damage. Human sources may find facilities inaccessible due to collapsed entrances. Intercepted communications have limited value when adversaries themselves lack complete damage information—and routinely engage in deception.
Given these constraints, intelligence professionals do what they’re trained to do: provide immediate assessments using available information, clearly communicate confidence levels, and refine analysis as more intelligence arrives. Initial assessments are frequently marked “low confidence”—a professional acknowledgment of information gaps, not analytical failure.
The intelligence community operates under rigorous standards because policymakers need honest assessments, even when those assessments are incomplete or unwelcome. When analysts provide preliminary BDA with appropriate confidence caveats, they’re fulfilling their obligation to give decision-makers the best information available at the time, while acknowledging analytical limitations.
Leaks disrupt the delicate balance between providing timely intelligence and maintaining operational security, and policymakers are rightly frustrated when sensitive assessments appear in the media before policy decisions can be made.
Whatever motivated the leak of preliminary battle damage assessments, the effect is counterproductive. When “low confidence” initial assessments appear publicly without context, they’re misconstrued as intelligence failures rather than analytical works in progress. While some reporters and commentators provide notional caveats about the preliminary nature of such findings, many still then pivot to implying or outright stating that the report undermines the president’s actions, judgments, or both. Doing so is politically motivated journalistic malpractice, and it unfairly damages intelligence professionals who are actually following proper protocols.
More troubling, such leaks erode the trust underpinning effective intelligence-policy relationships. When sensitive assessments become public prematurely, intelligence professionals face pressure to delay reports until confidence levels are higher, potentially depriving decision-makers of time-sensitive information. For example, it is unavoidably the case now that those analysts who are continuing to monitor this situation—because they’re human—are going to feel added pressure to validate the administration’s claims about the effects of the bobmings or to marshal overwhelming evidence to the contrary, that they’re unlikely to have. This creates friction in a process that should be as smooth and apolitical as possible.
This serves no one’s interests. Policymakers lose timely intelligence updates. Intelligence professionals face unfair criticism for doing their jobs responsibly. Adversaries benefit from a less robust and effective American intelligence process. It is bad all around.
The intelligence community has made mistakes and faced legitimate criticism in the past, so accountability remains essential. However, the leak of damage assessment of Iran’s nuclear facilities represents the opposite problem: Professionals are conducting analysis according to established standards and yet are facing public criticism for leaked assessments taken out of context.
The intelligence community appears to be fulfilling its responsibility to provide accurate, timely analysis with appropriate confidence levels. The failure lies with whoever leaked preliminary assessments, undermining both the analytical process and public confidence in institutions acting professionally.
Unauthorized disclosures that damage institutional credibility and operational effectiveness threaten our national security. Whatever short-term political advantage an opponent of the president might think this provides, it comes at the cost of long-term damage to institutions serving all administrations and protecting American interests regardless of who occupies the White House.
As global threats increase, we cannot afford to undermine institutions we depend on for national security. The intelligence community deserves criticism when it fails professional standards. It deserves defense when it meets those standards but faces unfair attack due to unauthorized disclosures by those seeking political advantage at national security’s expense.
