As the British used to wryly ask, “How goes the war?”—a generalized inquiry for updates on any given situation. Two weeks into Operation Epic Fury, the American public might be understandably confused if they were asked that question in earnest about our ongoing war. On the one hand, Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Gen. Dan Caine highlight the truly impressive and overwhelming military successes in joint press conferences, with Caine providing more objective information and Hegseth performing more of a pep rally. Social media users are bombarded by White House posts celebrating Iranian casualties and dismissively likening the conflict to video games. Deputy White House chief of staff Stephen Miller went on Fox News to declare, “There’s never in history been a more total asymmetric one-sided annihilation of the enemy than you are witnessing that is unfolding right now in Iran.”
But at the same time, a feeling of uncertainty is creeping up around the conflict. Some of this is borne out of unrealistic expectations: that war can be fought without casualties, or that anything other than immediate Iranian capitulation is a defeat, or that an operation longer than two weeks is a quagmire. These misunderstandings are sometimes compounded by well-intentioned yet misguided questions from the press, such as how long the campaign will take place—a question that skips a key analytical step.
The unease is also in part because of the natural second-order effects of a conflict with Iran, like rising gas prices—something the White House should have prepared the American people for rather than trying to talk up what an easy military effort this would be. But putting all the noise aside, there are real questions that linger about the long-term plan, what America has signed up for, and what the voters should expect as we continue the fight.
Three factors seem to be shaping this trepidation: the shifting goals and desired outcome of the operation, the gap between operational effects and the ability to achieve the strategic objective, and Iranian actions and the natural frictions of war. The administration should address each if it wants to achieve not only lasting success, but also to foster a better sense of understanding among the American people.
It is by no means a profound revelation to say President Donald Trump tends to fire from the hip when he weighs in on various issues. Starting in January, in reaction to nationwide protests in Iran, Trump has offered varying items as the primary grievance against the Iranian regime, and he’s spoken in hyperbolic, maximalist language about the consequences if Iran did something he disliked or didn’t do something he demanded. In January, he focused on protecting and supporting the protesters. At the State of the Union, he suggested our primary focus was destroying a nuclear weapons program he previously said was destroyed in the summer of 2025. In his statement announcing the beginning of Operation Epic Fury, he seemed to make regime change the goal of our offensive, calling on the Iranian people to “take over your government.” In the weeks since, the White House has tailored the scope to four goals: 1) destruction of ballistic missile capability, 2) destruction of the Iranian navy, 3) ending support for regional proxies, and 4) preventing Iran from ever acquiring a nuclear weapon. But even with this new, four-point end state, Trump still injects confusion, like when he demanded that he must have a role in selecting a new supreme leader. It is worth noting that it is fully possible the U.S. could achieve all of those newly specified goals without doing anything to help the Iranian people or give them hope for a democratic future—the original reason the president started ramping up his rhetorical drumbeat against Iran at the beginning of the year. Despite Karoline Leavitt’s claims to the contrary, the White House has not been, and still is not, “incredibly clear.” This goes to the earlier point about the misguided questions from the press—one cannot answer how long it will take to accomplish our goals if one has not been consistent as to what those goals even are.
The second factor is the current gap between our military operational successes and a strategic end state, the president’s vagueness notwithstanding. U.S. Central Command is, without doubt, overwhelming Iranian defenses and putting on a show of military capability that no other country could even attempt. But the question remains whether achieving all of the military objectives, or those the military can achieve alone, equals our national goal in the conflict with Iran.
Understanding this gap means assessing how each level of war supports and nests with the next level. The tactical level involves the basic “blocking and tackling” tasks one expects of the various specialized military units. This could be an Army infantry platoon conducting fire and maneuver in a company attack, a Navy carrier strike group conducting mutually supporting missile defense, which allows the carrier aircraft to conduct operations, or—probably most relevant to the current fight—a squadron of F-35s flying into Iranian airspace to strike designated targets.
At the next level, the operational level of war, tactics are synchronized, combining the skills of the various branches of the military, to create concentrated effects or, as Gen Caine called it last week, “a beautiful symphony of American spirit.” This level also requires the integration of several specialty tasks and enablers, like logistics (from refueling and resupplying ammunition to planning for evacuation and treatment of casualties), force protection measures, and cyber and electronic effects used to further perplex the enemy and mask our efforts until it is too late for our adversaries to react.
Successful operational effects require dozens and dozens of successful tactical efforts, each planned in coordination with one another and synchronized for maximum impact. But just as the linkage from tactical tasks to operational effects requires a cumulative effect—the sum total of the tactical impacts creating a larger success—operations must be properly nested with strategic goals in order to achieve the overall desired end state.
The strategic level of warfare requires even more effort from a more diverse set of participants. Unlike the tactical and operational levels, the strategic level of war isn’t solely the domain of the military—this is the level at which national goals for an effort are set and, as such, where a whole of government approach is required to achieve those goals. Of the four specified requirements of the campaign, the military can only achieve only the first two on their own. The latter two—unless the United States seeks regime change—require Iranian agreement to American demands. As of yet, despite the incredible destructive force unleashed by CENTCOM, the regime has made no signals or suggestions it will comply with any of these. Therefore, a gap exists between the current level of our operational effects and the means necessary to bring the additional strategic goals to fruition. Without additional ways and means to exert pressure or bring about completion of those goals, we are largely just hoping the Iranians grow weary—but this cedes the decision to them.
In other words, if our current level of effort is not sufficient to bring about the specified goals, what additional capabilities are we willing to bring to bear to do so? Or will the president amend his goals, picking a less aggressive and decisive endpoint?
Finally, as we often are told when entering into a conflict, “The enemy gets a vote.” Despite our overwhelming dominance in the current fight, the Iranians, as Caine has said, “(are) fighting, and I respect that.” Unable to contend with or counter the overwhelming American air and sea power, the Iranians have instead tried to fight back in ways that favor them. During the initial days of the conflict, the Iranians fired missiles and drones at American forces, U.S. bases in middle eastern countries, and even at civilian infrastructure of those countries the Iranians perceive to be aligned with the U.S. While these attacks have been largely ineffective or intercepted, the Iranians did kill six American soldiers in Kuwait—a solemn reminder that even the most effective military campaigns come with a cost in American blood. The Iranians have targeted international commerce in the Strait of Hormuz, causing the flow of oil and goods in the Persian Gulf to come to a halt, raising energy prices and threatening trade. And, most recently, the Iranians have conducted cyber attacks against American companies, portending future asymmetric or hybrid threats in the Western Hemisphere.
None of these suggest that the Iranians are winning the fight, but rather suggest that Trump should clearly communicate the difficulties of the conflict with the American people and prepare us for the challenges and future sacrifices that might be required. As the recent crash of a KC-135 refueling plane demonstrates, even if the enemy is not very effective, military operations are a dangerous business, and there will likely, and sadly, be more American deaths. And gas may remain expensive. And there may be disruptions from Iranian attacks here at home.
Iran is definitely not winning the war, and the United States is definitely not yet mired in a disastrous quagmire—anyone who prematurely claims either is likely more interested in President Trump’s political defeat than America’s military victory. But, like all nations in a conflict, the United States is finding itself dealing with complications that we did not anticipate— all combatants find themselves to be susceptible to the wise observations of Von Moltke the Elder and Mike Tyson. In some cases, these were assumptions that turned out to be inaccurate—like the hope that the Iranian regime would either collapse or capitulate after an initial offensive, or that the conflict would be complete before the Strait of Hormuz was affected. In some cases, these are because of inconsistent framing—making it harder to construct synchronized plans to achieve strategic goals when the goals themselves shift.
If we do not adapt and overcome these initial planning mistakes, then we may find ourselves in a situation where we do not win or in which we are embroiled in a continuing mess.To overcome these complications, we must refocus and purge ambiguity from the goal, the plan to achieve it, and the nation’s understanding of it. If not, we are likely to find ourselves having conducted a very effective, very lethal operation that leaves the job unfinished, with a disrupted, wounded, but just as oppositional Iran, licking its wounds, scheming to rebuild, and setting the countdown for the next time America has to deal with this threat. Without this realignment, we may find that Operation Epic Fury is just epic sound and fury, signifying nothing.
