The United States political system is failing. Expanding political divisions have been exacerbated by the machinations of a political class unwilling to sacrifice its prerogatives, irrespective of the nation’s desperate needs. For a time, the gerontocracy controlling political affairs in Washington seemed to mimic that in Moscow prior to the Soviet regime’s collapse.
In their latest show of political bankruptcy, leaders of the world’s most powerful nation recently proved incapable of passing a single appropriations bill, whether for America’s armed forces, air traffic regulation, border control, or any other federal function, however essential or superfluous.
More fundamentally, Washington is headed toward fiscal insolvency, with neither Democrats nor Republicans prepared to set priorities, make trade-offs, and balance wishes and resources. Today—even in the absence of an active conflict, financial crisis, or pandemic—America’s national debt as a share of the GDP approaches the record of 106 percent set in 1946, following the conclusion of the worst war in human history. The Congressional Budget Office foresees the coming decade with Washington engaging in some $2 trillion in additional borrowing every year, paying more than $1 trillion annually in interest. Both leading political parties routinely raise spending and cut taxes, expecting a deus ex machina to magically forestall eventual financial crisis and collapse.
There is no simple fix to what is genuinely a looming crisis, in contrast to the many faux emergencies proclaimed by politicians to advance their usually prosaic partisan ends. However, one idea worth trying is an older, somewhat dated one: congressional term limits.
“Even once-radical critics of the federal government tend to go native and become defenders and champions of programs they once vilified. The longer they remain in office, the more likely they are to become dedicated and powerful defenders of such programs.”
Doug Bandow
“We should want voters to select their politicians, and we should want those politicians to work hard to earn back their seats. Therefore, term limits are likely bad for both electoral accountability and public policy.”
Anthony Fowler
The challenges facing Congress date back well in time. The Senate was created to strengthen states, allowing legislatures to choose members expected to defend the interests of the states as much as residents. However, the shift to popular election of senators effectively eliminated the justification for two senators per state, irrespective of population. Meanwhile, the House has sacrificed its status as the democratic branch through bipartisan gerrymandering, as both major parties ostentatiously work to deny ever more of their own residents influence over state affairs and in state elections. As a result, more Americans have less investment in a political system that is delivering ever more risible results.
Of course, few members of the House or Senate are enthused with the idea of term limits. And understandably so. Beginning in the 1980s, a national term limits movement imposed legislative restrictions in many states through popular initiatives. However, Congress proved to be a tougher challenge. Turnover on Capitol Hill was lower than within the Soviet Communist Party’s Central Committee. Even many Republicans, who had included term limits in their “Contract with America” legislative blueprint, famously lost interest in capping their careers after gaining control of Congress in 1994. “If we Republicans straighten out the House … then I think maybe the nation’s desire for term limits will be diminished,” incoming Majority Leader Dick Armey observed in 1995.
Nevertheless, by the mid-1990s, term limit activists—relying primarily on state initiatives—had succeeded in imposing restrictions in 23 states, covering almost half of the House members. But the Supreme Court, in a controversial 5-4 decision, overturned these controls in U.S. Term Limits Inc. v. Thornton (1995). Now, only a federal constitutional amendment, an increasingly impossible political procedure, can impose term limits. This has left a permanent political class in charge of America’s future, and the country’s future at risk.
It wasn’t always this way. Congressional elections were once a blood sport in America. In the 19th century, elections sometimes resulted in mass turnover due to public disillusionment over profound issues, such as slavery. During the mid-1800s, overall House return rates rarely rose above 50 percent. (Senators were still chosen by state legislators, not voters directly.) Party control also oscillated. Gerrymandering occurred but was not refined. The population was not as numerous, with smaller constituencies making it easier to reach individual voters. Politics had not yet been so professionalized, and there were fewer tools of incumbent protection available. However, in succeeding years, political competition steadily eased. By the turn of the century, the percentage of House members returning rarely fell below 70 percent.
In the 1950s, reelection rates seldom dropped under 80 percent, and Democrats enjoyed an extended period of one-party control in which incumbency created a gerontocratic and unrepresentative leadership, highlighted by the peculiar dominance of southern Democrats. The 1974 Democratic congressional sweep elevated younger, more progressive members, but many of them eventually turned into what became a new geriatric elite. Finally, the 1994 congressional race featured a dramatic and surprising Republican triumph, initiating a period of oscillating party control. Nevertheless, incumbency continued to limit congressional competition. One analysis figured that even in 1994, when the GOP finally gained control of the House, it would have won as many as 41 additional seats had incumbency not been a factor.
Today, congressional reelection rates remain high and continue to reinforce seniority, keeping power within a small, if bipartisan, political circle. In the 2020s, presidents and many congressional leaders ranged in age from the late 60s to 80s. Although younger members have since moved into several top legislative roles, Republicans, in particular, have exhibited a willingness to sacrifice the public interest and even their own institutions’ prerogatives to avoid risking reelection, in this case from presidential criticism that might fuel a primary challenge. There may be no clearer example of the failings of a selfish, coddled elite.
Americans would benefit from a revival of the term limits movement, with new initiatives in several states to again restrict the tenure of U.S. legislators. In the decades before turnover steadily fell, lawmakers elected during weren’t necessarily smarter, more knowledgeable, or even more competent. However, with incumbency offering less protection than today, challengers, including potentially disruptive candidates, had a greater chance of winning. The resulting membership churn inhibited the creation of a professional political class. Many people still made a life of politics but were more likely to switch between jobs and spend at least some time in the political wilderness.
Congressional term limits would similarly create a more competitive political process. Of course, better policy wouldn’t necessarily result. But term limits likely would deliver a better political process and thus better legislators. At the very least, term limits would make federal legislators more accountable to their constituents and feature more competitive elections decided on policy rather than name recognition and constituency service. A California study found that term limits on state legislators had reduced the number of incumbents running for and winning reelection, as well as their margins of victory. The number of candidates increased and uncontested races fell. More women were elected. Of course, this did not presage a GOP renaissance. Term limits mattered, but remained secondary to larger political trends, such as California’s hard shift left.
Perhaps the most important potential benefit of congressional term limits would be to short-circuit the Orwellian transformation of legislators, akin to the conclusion of Animal Farm, in which the once-revolutionary pigs became human oppressors. Term limits would force voters to replace legislators before they reach that stage. The late Sen. Warren Rudman said he retired because “the longer you stay in public office, the more distant the outside world becomes.” The process becomes self-reinforcing, as those who want to make politics a career adopt policies that favor those who want to make politics a career.
There are significant, real-world consequences of such cycles. Economists Randall Holcombe and Robert Gmeiner found that growth rates in outlays and taxes were between 16 percent and 46 percent lower in states with term limits. Legislative voting records demonstrated that legislators become bigger spenders and regulators the longer they remain in office. Most glaring has been the impact on professed conservatives. Even once-radical critics of the federal government tend to go native and become defenders and champions of programs they once vilified. The longer they remain in office, the more likely they are to become dedicated and powerful defenders of such programs. So it is best to force them out early.
Defenders of a permanent legislative class contend that eliminating lifelong legislators would merely empower lifelong staffers. However, changing legislative membership would help transform congressional staff as well, especially among personal (rather than committee) aides. As for lawmakers, there is no evidence that the presence of members who serve for decades improves the legislative process. If so, Uncle Sam wouldn’t be racing toward insolvency while failing to fund current operations. “[The] qualities and characteristics associated with being a ‘professional’ legislator run counter to the supposed goals of a representative democracy,” Mark Petracca of the University of California, Irvine, argued.
Thus, Americans across the political spectrum should press for congressional term limits through a constitutional amendment applicable to all states. Since Congress would not likely vote to limit its own terms, however, such a change would require a constitutional convention, which would be a jump into the unknown. Winning ratification by three-quarters of the states would also pose a substantial challenge.
An alternative would be to revive congressional limits imposed by states on their elected representatives. Of course, the Thornton precedent ensures that lower federal courts would summarily void any new state-imposed measures. However, multiple new laws would encourage the Supreme Court to take up the challenge. And with an almost entirely new membership—only Justice Clarence Thomas, who authored the Thornton dissent, remains—the high court might reach a different result than it did in 1995. “Nothing in the Constitution deprives the people of each state of the power to prescribe eligibility requirements for the candidates who seek to represent them in Congress. The Constitution is simply silent on this question,” Justice Thomas wrote.
If upheld, such an approach would be incomplete, but would still help positively transform the national political process. Even if the Supreme Court rejected term limits, the spectacle of a renewed citizens’ revolt might spur more activists to challenge entrenched incumbents and encourage the public to vote for challengers.
Of course, term limits should not be the only reform considered. Expanding the number of congressional districts would also dilute the professional political class and reduce opportunities for gerrymandering. Ranked-choice voting and reductions in incumbency protection could improve the legislative process.
In any case, an alert and determined citizenry will remain essential to preserving the American republic. To achieve that end, constituents should press their members to support a constitutional amendment limiting legislative terms. Term limits would provide more people with more opportunities to serve directly. This would be a good result, even if not a perfect remedy.
