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The Iranian Regime Played 3D Chess—and Lost

For years, Washington pundits bemoaned Western diplomats’ shortcomings with their counterparts from the Islamic Republic. Iranian negotiators would routinely blindside them, buying time for their nuclear program. They sowed discord among adversaries. They deployed plausible deniability. They played arsonists while winning praises as firefighters. They were masters of tridimensional chess, bamboozling their interlocutors with drawn-out games they routinely won hands down. 

Yet, since October 7, 2023, when Hamas launched Operation Al-Aqsa Flood, massacring more than 1,200 Israelis and taking 250 hostages back to Gaza, the ayatollahs and their proxies keep losing their kings and queens in a series of unforced errors that reveal monumental misjudgment. Worse, as President Donald J. Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu make their queen’s gambit, Iran has already foolishly squandered many of its pawns—its fearsome regional proxies—that it patiently built up for decades to serve as its nuclear program’s and the regime’s very first line of defense in case of direct conflict with Israel and the United States.

Tehran lavishly invested in a robust buildup of terrorist organizations that shared common enemies, embraced its ideological worldview, and advanced its imperial ambitions. For a time, it seemed as if its proxies and their successes would make Iran’s regional power grab unstoppable. By the eve of October 7, Israel was encircled. Hezbollah ruled over South Lebanon, amassing an awesome missile arsenal and a fierce, battle-hardened militia, while blackmailing that country’s government into subservience. Bashar al-Assad’s truncated fiefdom, Syria, depended on Iranian military might and largesse to stay in power and in return gave Iranian forces unfettered access to its southern border, whence they could threaten Israel. In Iraq, Iran’s influence over the political system and its bankrolling and training of local Shiite militias guaranteed a land bridge to feed Iran’s allies with weapons and funding. At the far end of the Arabian Peninsula, the Houthis gave Iran the ability to permanently pester Tehran’s archrivals, the Sunni powers of the Gulf, while casting a spell over the Bab El Mandeb gate—together with the Strait of Hormuz, one of the most sensitive waterways in the world for energy supplies and global maritime commerce.

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Map by James Hilston for The Dispatch.

All told, this was a formidable force, a veritable deterrent that could mount fierce resistance against anyone who dared to threaten the king and queen of Iran’s chessboard. Over the years, Iran’s pawns did occasionally sustain fire, but never took a severe enough beating that they were lost. Confrontations typically ended in drawn-out contests that left them standing and, thanks to Iranian solicitude, able to resume their roles. This strategy could have paid off handsomely on October 7, 2023, had every proxy simultaneously opened fire against Israel once Hamas broke through the Israel-Gaza border. Instead, the proxies hesitated. Left in the dark about the timing of Hamas’ invasion, they belatedly started shooting at Israel—Hezbollah’s opening salvo came the next day—and even then, they never went all in. From Tehran’s standpoint, this was a fateful mistake. The proxies were a nuisance but never overwhelmed Israel when the Jewish state was vulnerable and still reeling from the horror of October 7. What it did, however, was to change Israel’s calculus. Jerusalem’s prior restraint vanished, leading to increasingly daring and brazen responses that left Iran’s proxies more bamboozled than the Western diplomats Tehran supposedly took for endless, joyless rides for years.

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