Authored by Victor Davis Hanson via American Greatness,
At the August 15 Alaska summit, Vladimir Putin performed as expected. He desperately wants an end to Western sanctions, détente with the U.S., and assurances that the U.S. will not impose a disastrous anti-Russian secondary boycott—and, apparently, some additional Ukrainian territory.
Consequently, Putin, in his media synopsis, talked more about restored friendship with a “neighborly” United States under Trump. He scarcely mentioned Ukraine directly—other than to imply to Westerners that he seeks not merely to annex a foreign country, but to reclaim what he views as a former Soviet province with ancient ties to the Russian people.
Trump did not get his ceasefire with Putin. But he quickly pivoted to remind us that the table is set for a supposedly comprehensive peace without first requiring a temporary cessation of arms.
Trump addressed the media more succinctly and with greater discretion than Putin, appearing more optimistic that the Russian-American hostility was thawing. And he views normalization as a necessary step toward comprehensive peace in the weeks to come.
The left lambasted Trump for speaking politely of Putin and vice versa. There was additional criticism of a Fox interview in which Trump mentioned “land swaps” and for his supposed prior naïveté in believing he could obtain a ceasefire with Putin.
Yet for all the posturing, we have known for some time the general outlines of a peace, how it could come about, and why it has not yet happened.
Ukraine will not join NATO, but will likely be fully armed by the West. Ukraine lacks the power to retake Crimea or the Donbass, but with Western aid, it can preserve most of its territory.
Russia is worn out, but it is not yet ready to give up and may not be even after the envisioned destructive secondary sanctions. Putin will only make peace when his dictatorship feels it has advanced far enough westward (perhaps 100 miles west of the border) to justify to the oligarchy and military his foolhardy invasion and the needless toll of one million Russians dead, wounded, missing, or captured.
No one knows where a hypothetical DMZ line might eventually be drawn. But for now, it depends on which army has the greater wherewithal and momentum to push its enemy backward before there is a general consensus to stop the madness.
These contours of peace can be shaped by promises of trade deals and normalization between Russia and the West. Or, contrarily, they can be realized by threats of tougher sanctions and boycotts, as well as by security guarantees to Ukraine, by near-permanent aid to Ukraine to maintain its quite formidable army and deterrence, or by internal erosion from the war either in Ukraine or Russia.
Yet few critics of the administration address the unmentionables that likely account for the above general outlines of a settlement.
There are some realities that serve as subtexts to any possible agreement that cannot be simply thought away.
1. Ukraine could only regain Crimea and the Donbass and return to its pre-2022 borders by a historic transference of U.S. and European arms, intelligence, logistical support, and financial aid that would be little short of actively fighting nuclear Russia.
Europe talks grandly of unlimited support. But some Europeans still buy Russian energy, slow-walk aid, seem exhausted by the war, and are likely in time to peel away as they once did from the endless “no-fly zones” over Saddam’s Iraq after the first Gulf War. Europe sounds as if it fields vast armies, but in truth, Putin believes European support will erode more quickly than Ukrainian resistance or American help.
So, for all the talk of an “exhausted” Russia, there is a silent consensus that a depopulated and broken Ukraine cannot sustain its current levels of resistance without a much greater Western profile. And that is unlikely to happen.
2. Notably, the left never really dwells on the likely 1.5 million dead, wounded, missing, and captured from three and a half years of war. It is a humanitarian nightmare, a modern Stalingrad that makes Gaza look like child’s play.
Yet Westerners are far more likely to posture on the human costs of the “genocide” in the distant Mideast wars than on Europe’s doorstep. Perhaps Germany or France feels it can influence Netanyahu by performance-art declarations of statehood for the Palestinians (on the quiet assumption that Israel is Western, friendly, and more likely to listen to Euro-moralizing than is a proximate, hostile, and dangerous Putin’s Russia).
Strangely, Trump alone seems to be lamenting the needless loss of thousands of lives each month, with no end in sight. It is fine to demand zero concessions to Putin or to accuse any who seek negotiations through land swaps as appeasers. But it is quite another to lay out a strategic plan for victory and complete recovery of pre-2014 Ukrainian territory, the likely costs necessary for such an ambitious strategy, and who, and for how long, will pay the tab.
3. There is a long history, both peaceful and hostile, between Russia and Ukraine that Westerners often ignore due to the current naked aggression of Putin and the murderous nature of his regime. Nonetheless, most recently, since 1939, the borders of present-day Ukraine have been fluid and changeable between Poland, Ukraine, Belarus, and Russia. There still remains strong Russian influence and even support in Eastern Ukraine. And there has been a Western naivete since the end of the Cold War about pre-Putin Russia’s trip-wire sensitivity to the eastward trajectory of Western military alliances toward Russia and the more insidious Westernization of former and still mostly Russian-speaking areas of the old Soviet Union.
The current tensions with Canada and the U.S. would certainly boil over if China were to begin overtly championing the Canadian cause. Americans remember the 1962 U.S. response to Castro’s Cuba when Nikita Khrushchev broke Cold War conventions by strategically arming a third-nation proxy on America’s doorstep.
4. Talking to a monstrous Putin is not treasonous, foolhardy, or unnecessary. FDR openly courted, joked with, and even praised (“Uncle Joe”) an even greater monster in Joseph Stalin, who by 1941 had the blood of nearly 20 million Russians on his hands. Stalin had already invaded pro-Western Finland and Poland. And between September 1, 1939, and June 22, 1941, he had enabled Adolf Hitler to overrun much of Western Europe, hoping Germany would destroy both the West and itself in the process.
Nixon did not just “go to China” but sought to change the geostrategic nuclear landscape by courting Mao Zedong, the greatest mass murderer of the 20th century.
Not calling Putin a “killer” and “murderer” at the summit is hardly appeasement but more like art-of-the-deal, speaking softly while carrying a big stick, rather than Biden-style loud rhetoric while carrying a twig. Who is the greater humanitarian—the inert and anemic blowhard who resorts to name-calling a “murderous thug,” or the president willing to meet face-to-face with a monster to explore costly ways of halting the mass slaughter?
5. Finally, few seem to remember that Trump is a latecomer to the Ukrainian-Russian mess.
In the end, we should remember it was not Trump who once talked grandly of a soon-to-be NATO Ukraine or who for years welched on the promise to spend a meager 2 percent of GDP on defense.
It was not Trump who pushed a plastic red button to embark on a “Russian reset” with a voracious Putin. It was not Trump who invited Russia back into the Middle East after a nearly 40-year hiatus.
It was not Trump who, after the reset’s failure, moved on to concoct “Russian collusion” and “Russian disinformation” to use Russia to destroy a political rival. It was not Trump who went to Ukraine, threatened to hold up aid, and fired a prosecutor looking into his son’s selling to Ukrainians the influence of his father’s vice presidency.
It was not Trump on whose watch Putin invaded Georgia, the Donbass, and Crimea, and sought to absorb Kyiv.
It was not Trump who dreamed up the Nord Stream 2 pipeline to subsidize green energy fantasies—while still buying Russian energy.
And it was not Trump who conditioned his possible reaction to Putin’s invasion based on whether it might be “minor.”
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